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Deliberate premarket underpricing and aftermarket mispricing: New 
insights on IPO pricing 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We decompose initial returns into deliberate premarket underpricing and aftermarket mispricing 
using Stochastic Frontier Analysis. We model deliberate underpricing as a function of proxies of 
information asymmetry surrounding IPO value between market participants. Equity retained is an 
unlikely signalling mechanism to convey IPO value to outside investors through deliberate 
premarket underpricing. The presence of lock-in agreements, underwriter fees, number of uses of 
proceeds, and venture capital or private equity backing have positive impacts on deliberate 
premarket underpricing. Demand for firms' capital also explains deliberate premarket 
underpricing, whereas new issues market conditions have no impact. All these factors are found to 
explain a significant fraction of the variations in our deliberate underpricing estimates. Deliberate 
underpricing is the more dominant component that makes up initial return when compared to the 
fraction of aftermarket mispricing.  We attribute aftermarket mispricing to trading volume in IPO 
shares on the first day, price adjustment between the filing price range and the offer price, and offer 
size. Equity retained explains the aftermarket mispricing rather than the deliberate premarket 
underpricing in contradiction to the signalling argument. More reputable underwriters are likely to 
provide price support in the early aftermarket, whereas we observe no impact on deliberate 
premarket underpricing.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Initial IPO return, deliberate premarket underpricing, aftermarket mispricing 
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1. Introduction  
 
An initial public offering (IPO) is the first sale of shares by a private company to the public on a 
securities exchange. The valuation of shares of an unlisted company is challenging due to the 
absence of current market prices and trading history. Information asymmetry between market 
participants surrounding the value of these shares leaves the new issues market subject to Akerlof’s 
(1970) classic adverse selection problem which manifests itself in persistent average initial return 
across capital markets.1 Figure 1 documents average initial return and the persistence of the 
phenomenon as well as the number of U.S. IPOs by quarterly intervals from the first quarter of 1980 
to the last quarter of 2012. The diagram illustrates the cyclicity in persistent initial return as well as 
the number of IPOs during the sample period. 
 
Figure 1: Average initial return and number of US IPOs by quarterly intervals, 19802012 
 
Average initial return is the equally-weighted mean of the percentage change from the offer price in the 
premarket to the aftermarket price.  Quarterly data on initial return and the number of IPOs are compiled 
from monthly observations available from Jay Ritter's website (http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter).2 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 Initial return is the percentage change from the offer price to the market price in the aftermarket. See, for 
example, Table 1 in Banerjee, Dai, and Keshab (2011), Table 6 in Ritter (2003), and Jay Ritter’s web site 
(http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter) that has regular updates of Table 1 in Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist 
(1994). 
2 This is the URL address for all future references to Jay Ritter’s IPO website.  
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The literature offers three main explanations for persistent average initial return: deliberate 
underpricing in the premarket (henceforth deliberate underpricing), mispricing in the early 
aftermarket as a result of trading activity, and underwriter price stabilization in the early 
aftermarket.3 The first strand of the literature ascribes initial return to deliberate underpricing as 
the outcome of information asymmetry surrounding IPO value among participants in the 
premarket. For example, Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Welch (1989), and Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989) use deliberate underpricing as a costly and difficult to imitate signal in which firm insiders 
transmit positive information on firm value to outside investors. Baron (1982) explains deliberate 
underpricing and the persistence of the phenomenon as the outcome of a principal-agent conflict in 
which the issuing firm (principal) cannot directly observe the marketing and distribution efforts of 
the underwriter (agent).  The underwriter can thus induce the issuing firm to agree to a relatively 
low offer price. Rock’s (1986) model assumes that IPOs have to be, on average, underpriced to 
compensate less-well informed investors for a winner’s curse4 problem and to induce them to 
participate in the new issues market. 
The second strand of the literature assumes that IPOs are priced at their intrinsic value in the 
premarket and attributes initial return to trading activity in the early aftermarket as a result of, for 
example, overoptimistic investors and their valuations. For example, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) 
focus on fads in the IPO market whereby new issues are possibly not priced at intrinsic values in 
early aftermarket trading. Ritter (1991) and Loughran and Ritter (1995) explain initial return as a 
consequence of investors being overoptimistic about firm value which creates excess demand in 
shares, pushes up prices and leads to high initial return in the aftermarket. Friesen and Swift 
(2009) attribute initial return to investor overreaction at the time of the IPO before prices revert 
back to fundamental firm value. Aggarwal (2000, 2003), Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2000, 2002) 
and Ellis (2006) find evidence that flipping is not solely responsible for high trading volumes in the 
early aftermarket. 77% of trades are investor-motivated, while interdealer trading accounts for the 
remaining 23%. Chahine (2007) report a positive relationship between the share demand-to-offer 
ratio in the premarket and the trading volume in the aftermarket.  
The third strand of the literature attributes positive average initial return to underwriter price 
support. The price support leads to a censoring of the return distribution and the spurious 
impression of persistent average initial return. For example, Ruud (1993), Asquith, Jones and 
Kieschnick (1998) and Aggarwal (2000, 2003) find that underwriters stabilize the aftermarket 
prices at the offer price which results in very few IPO stocks being overpriced.  
                                                        
3 ‘Premarket’ indicates the time leading up to the IPO date (stock market flotation), whereas ‘aftermarket’ 
refers to the time once trading commences in the stock market. 
4 A winner’s curse arises here because less-well informed investors obtain a higher proportion of overpriced 
IPOs because better-informed investors only apply for underpriced new issues. 
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On the one hand, existing research explains positive average initial return and its persistence as 
a combination of deliberate underpricing and aftermarket mispricing as a result of trading in the 
early aftermarket. The most commonly held view is that deliberate underpricing is the main 
contributor towards persistent average initial return (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989; 
Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Baron, 1982; and Rock, 1986). On the other hand, empirical studies do 
not distinguish between deliberate underpricing and aftermarket mispricing when testing 
competing theories.5 However, the lack of such a distinction is not surprising. Disentangling 
deliberate underpricing and aftermarket mispricing from initial return is difficult. To do so requires 
a 'fair' offer price, which is not directly observable, in addition to the offer price and the closing 
share price in the aftermarket.  
In this paper, we identify this ‘fair’ offer price using stochastic frontier analysis (henceforth SFA), 
which estimates the maximum achievable offer price from given issuing firm attributes, deal 
characteristics, third-party certification, and IPO market conditions. SFA assumes the existence of 
an efficient pricing frontier such that the offer price falls onto or below the estimated frontier due 
to a systematic one-sided error to account for pricing inefficiency plus a random error term. The 
one-sided error term allows calculating an inefficiency measure to uncover deliberate underpricing 
from the maximum offer price that lies on the efficient frontier. Our approach builds on existing 
studies in this area, such as for example, Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996), Koop and Li (2001), 
Francis and Hasan (2001), Chen, Hung and Wu (2002), and Chan, Wu and Kwok (2007).  
Compared to these earlier studies, our stochastic IPO pricing frontier uses an extended set of 
pricing factors to estimate the maximum (fair) achievable offer price. These pricing factors are the 
primary drivers of equity value and originate from standard finance theory. They include, for 
example, proxy variables for expected cash flows, cost of capital, and future growth prospects. 
These value drivers determine the efficient frontier of fair offer prices. An incomplete set of pricing 
factors could lead to less accurate estimates of fair offer prices and hence less precise estimates of 
deliberate underpricing. Our estimation of the pricing frontier simultaneously controls for what we 
call underpricing factors to explain variations in deliberate underpricing. For this, we use a set of 
variables drawing from existing theories on information asymmetry surrounding IPO value among 
new issues market participants such as, for example, Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Welch (1989), 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Baron (1982), and Rock (1986). Finally, after having identified 
deliberate underpricing, we uncover aftermarket mispricing, which allows us to explain 
aftermarket mispricing with the help of proxy measures that capture trading activity in the early 
aftermarket. We argue that IPO market value partly depends on this trading activity and use 
relevant proxy variables from earlier studies such as, for example, Chen, Hung and Wu (2002), Ellis 
(2006), and Agarwal (2003). 
                                                        
5 For an overview of the empirical literature see, for example, Jenkingson and Ljungqvist (2001). 
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We hence make several distinct contributions to the literature in light of the ongoing debate on 
whether deliberate underpricing or aftermarket mispricing is the dominant explanation of 
observed initial return. First, we add to the literature on the use of SFA as a tool for differentiating 
deliberate premarket underpricing from initial return. The use of SFA to measure deliberate 
premarket underpricing in U.S. IPOs was first proposed by Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996), 
with later applications by Koop and Li (2001) and Francis and Hasan (2001).6 By estimating 
deliberate underpricing, we can test whether initial returns is primarily driven by deliberate 
underpricing or by aftermarket mispricing as a result of early trading in the aftermarket.  
Second, using a more refined measure, we test the commonly held view that information 
asymmetry surrounding IPO value among new issues market participants explains variations in 
deliberate underpricing. While existing studies have tested the explanatory power of information 
asymmetry theories, these have been conducted using initial return, which is a combination of 
deliberate underpricing and aftermarket mispricing. By constructing a more refined measure of 
deliberate premarket underpricing, we are able to directly test how it is affected by variables 
proxying information asymmetry, and hence improve on these earlier studies. We test the effect of 
information asymmetry on deliberate underpricing by exploiting developments in the SFA 
literature on the modelling of exogenous factors affecting the distance from the frontier. For this, 
we use the conditional variance model proposed in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), simultaneously 
estimating the stochastic pricing frontier alongside the determinants of deliberate underpricing. 
Finally, once we have estimated the deliberate underpricing component, we recover an estimate 
of aftermarket mispricing and then test whether it can be explained primarily by trading activity. 
Accordingly, we regress this aftermarket mispricing component of initial return against proxies of 
trading activity, allowing us to test the hypothesis that IPO market value partly depends on the 
trading activity in the early aftermarket. 
 
2. Disentangling deliberate premarket underpricing and aftermarket mispricing 
 
The central contribution of this paper is to disentangle deliberate underpricing in the premarket 
and aftermarket mispricing from initial returns, and test whether variations in these components 
can be explained by existing theories. Differentiating these components from observed initial 
returns relies crucially on being able to estimate a fair offer price for each IPO.  We estimate the fair 
offer price using SFA, a benchmarking econometric technique that has seen numerous applications 
since it was originally proposed independently by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen, 
and van de Broeck (1977). A few studies have used SFA as a tool to measure deliberate 
underpricing in IPOs. Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996) is the first study to apply SFA in IPO 
pricing. They use firm characteristics, industry dummy variables and market sentiment to estimate 
                                                        
6 To the best of our knowledge these are the only studies using U.S. data.  
 6 
the fair offer price and deliberate underpricing on a sample of 1,035 US IPOs between 1975 and 
1984. In their study, offer price is related to a number of pricing factors, including book value, sales, 
number of risks disclosed in the prospectus, underwriter commission rates, equity retained by pre-
IPO owners, firm age, offer proceeds from issue, and price-earnings ratio. The analysis divides the 
sample into hot issue and non-hot issue periods to capture market sentiment, whereby time 
intervals with relatively high initial return and large numbers of IPOs are deemed to be hot new 
issues markets. The authors estimate deliberate underpricing at 8.9% and 8.0% respectively for 
both hot-issue and non-hot issue markets. These estimates compare to observed average initial 
return of 10.28% and 9.12% respectively. In a further analysis, the authors regress initial return 
(based on the first available aftermarket bid price) against the estimated deliberate underpricing 
component and find a significant positive correlation only for the hot issues period. They conclude 
that deliberate underpricing explains only a fraction of the observed initial return during hot issue 
periods. 
Francis and Hasan (2001) use SFA to compare the underpricing of venture capital backed with 
non-venture capital backed IPOs to test existing evidence in the literature that suggests the degree 
of initial return depends on venture capital (VC) backing. The offer price correlates with firm size, 
offer proceeds, the ratio of underwriter fee to offer size, underwriter reputation, equity retention 
by pre-IPO owners, and NYSE as the place of flotation. The authors estimate a combined frontier on 
a sample of 843 U.S. IPOs between 1990 and 1993, as well as separate frontiers for VC backed and 
non-VC backed new issues.  Estimates of the average deliberate underpricing is 29.1% for the 
pooled sample, while the figures for VC backed and non-VC backed IPOs are 35.3% and 27.1% 
respectively.  A follow up regression shows a positive and statistically significant association 
between initial return and deliberate underpricing.  Disaggregating these estimates into size deciles 
suggests that deliberate underpricing decreases with increased firm size. 
Koop and Li (2001) apply Bayesian SFA to investigate the valuation of a pooled sample of 2,969 
IPOs and 3,771 seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in the U.S. between 1985 and 1998. Their study 
departs from Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis' (1996)’s approach in two ways. Firstly, Koop and Li 
(2001) argue that SFA using IPOs only is likely to result in these issues being more efficiently priced 
which leads to underpricing being underestimated. Therefore, Koop and Li (2001) recommend 
constructing the pricing frontier from both IPOs and SEOs. This approach is more likely to place 
SEOs closer to the frontier, while IPOs would be further away from the frontier, resulting in higher 
levels of IPO underpricing. Koop and Li (2001) therefore analyse whether IPOs are underpriced per 
se in relation to SEOs, rather than whether some IPOs are underpriced more than other new issues. 
Secondly, they use market capitalization as an aggregate measure of firm value rather than offer 
price per share which depends on the number of shares in free float. Another contribution of their 
study involves the explicit separation of pricing from underpricing factors in estimation.  The 
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pricing factors affect the frontier and include net income, revenue, earnings per share, total assets, 
debt, and underwriter fees. The underpricing factors include dummy variables to capture SEOs, hot 
and cold new issues periods, NBER peak issue months, NYSE new issues, multiple offers made by 
issuers, and the top five lead managers acting as underwriters ranked by market share. The results 
reveal a positive association between firm value, net income, revenues, total assets, and 
underwriter fees, while the correlation between firm value and leverage is negative. Firms 
operating in industry sectors with higher earnings potential such as, for example, chemical 
products, computers, electronic equipment, scientific instruments and communications also have 
higher valuations. Among the underpricing factors, only the dummy variables on SEO and multiple 
offers made are positive and statistically significant. IPOs are, on average, found to be undervalued 
by between 25% and 30%, while SEOs, which drive the frontier, are undervalued by at most 5%. 
Chen, Hung and Wu (2002) apply SFA to measure deliberate premarket underpricing and 
aftermarket mispricing for a sample of 196 Taiwanese IPOs spanning the period 1985 to 1995. 
These authors use as pricing factors firm age, offer proceeds, equity retained by pre-IPO owners, 
earnings per share, total assets, and the industry price-earnings ratio. The study reports an average 
deliberate premarket underpricing of 7.46% for the pooled sample, while the figures for hot and 
cold new issues periods are 7.16 and 7.72%, respectively. The authors fail to find any significant 
relationship in a regression of adjusted initial return7 on deliberate underpricing. In a further 
analysis, they investigate whether noisy trading in the aftermarket explains initial return. Noisy 
trading is proxied by variables measuring the probability of receiving an allocation of IPO shares, 
the proportion of shares retained by pre-IPO owners, and firm size. All three variables have a 
positive and significant association with the 30-day adjusted initial return. In a further test, the 
authors investigate whether IPOs suffer from poor returns in the long term after noisy trading 
activities subside but could not find evidence of a positive correlation in a regression of 3 year 
holding returns on variables proxying noisy trading. 
 Chan, Wu and Kwok (2007) use SFA to study the impact of global offer prices on the pricing of 
U.S. IPOs using a sample of 2,307 new issues between 1986 and 1998. The study uses both pricing 
factors and underpricing factors to estimate the efficient frontier of offer prices. Pricing factors 
comprise earnings per share, the standard deviation of the firm's first 120 daily returns, offer price 
revision, gross spread as a percentage of offer size, the rank of the lead underwriter, a spin-off 
dummy variable, dummy variables indicating the stock exchange (NYSE, AMEX, NASDAQ), market 
capitalization, and industry sector dummy variables. The underpricing factor is a dummy variable 
capturing global IPOs. The estimation follows the Batesse and Coelli (1995) conditional mean 
                                                        
7 These are cumulative seven day (as well as thirty day and three year) returns less the estimated deliberate 
premarket underpricing component. 
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model, revealing that purely domestic IPOs are underpriced by 3.1 percentage points more than 
global IPOs.  
Peng and Wang (2007) employ SFA and focus on the impact of offer methods on offer prices 
using a sample of 647 Taiwanese IPOs between 1996 and 2003. They use a two-stage approach to 
estimating underpricing of IPOs and its determinants. In the first stage, they estimate a stochastic 
frontier using earnings per share, total assets, firm age, debt ratio, and proportion of stocks 
retained by pre-IPO owners at flotation as pricing factors. The first stage is estimated by the 
method of moment approach.  In the second stage, the authors run a regression of the estimates of 
underpricing (from the first stage) on a number of determinants. The underpricing factors include 
offer methods, return and volatility of market index, probability of stock allocation in 
oversubscribed offerings, offer size, amount of sales, level of earnings management, underwriter 
reputation, auditor reputation, industry dummy variables, and stock market dummy variables.  A 
key finding is that the auction method reduces the average underpricing when compared to fixed-
price offerings.  In addition, the study reports that greater earnings potential, less risk or offers with 
less information asymmetry have lower underpricing. 
Finally, in a recent paper, Luo and Ouyang (2014) use Bayesian SFA to analyse the pricing 
efficiency of 379 IPOs in the ChiNext market8 between 2009 and 2014.  They base their input 
variables on fundamentals of issuers, information asymmetry surrounding IPO value, offer 
characteristics, and market environment. The authors claim that underwriters are predominantly 
responsible for pricing inefficiency in the ChiNext market. 
Although all the above studies use SFA to measure deliberate premarket underpricing, it is 
noteworthy that, with the exception of Koop and Li (2001), there is no study that explicitly 
separates out pricing factors and controls for underpricing factors in the IPO pricing frontier. In 
addition, none of the existing studies attempts to relate the deliberate premarket underpricing to 
proxy variables that capture information asymmetry between market participants, which is one of 
the dominant explanations of persistent average initial return. Existing studies which use such 
proxy variables use them as part of the pricing factors, instead of treating these proxy variables as 
affecting the degree of deliberate underpricing.  
Our paper thus makes several contributions to the existing literature. We separate out pricing 
factors and underpricing factors and control for these in the IPO pricing frontier. The efficient 
pricing frontier enables us to determine the degree of deliberate premarket underpricing. We 
include commonly used proxy variables that reflect information asymmetry between market 
participants to explain variations in deliberate premarket underpricing. Disentangling the 
                                                        
8 ChiNext was launched in October 2009 in China to provide a new financing platform to raise capital for 
small- and medium-sized enterprises. 
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deliberate premarket underpricing from the observed initial return enables us to also examine 
whether trading activity in the early aftermarket can explain the residual mispricing component.  
 
 
3. Offer price, pricing factors and underpricing factors 
 
In line with most of the earlier studies quoted above, the offer price per share is the dependent 
variable in our stochastic frontier. The independent variables are pricing factors, which are primary 
drivers of equity value and originate from standard finance theory. Estimates of inefficiency reflect 
deliberate premarket underpricing and variations in these are related to proxy variables that 
capture various types of information asymmetries surrounding IPO value between participants in 
the new issues market.  
 
3.1. Pricing factors 
 
Estimating expected cash flow, cost of capital and growth opportunities to value the equity of IPOs 
is nontrivial. Relatively little is known about the past performance of IPO firms and their future 
prospects. Instead of attempting to estimate expected cash flow, cost of capital and growth 
opportunities directly, we use several proxy measures. 
We use earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in the most recent 
twelve-month period before going public as an input into our valuation model even though finance 
theory advocates using cash flows. EBITDA is a better predictor of future operating cash flows than 
current operating cash flows as evidenced in previous research. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) find 
that earnings better reflect a more long-term stream of wealth creation than cash flows that are 
subject to higher annual volatility. Also, IPO prospectuses do not normally disclose objective 
(audited) cash flow forecasts and estimates of cost of capital.  In the long-term, earnings converge 
to cash flows. We rely on EBITDA as opposed to earnings per share (EPS) to circumvent claims that 
IPO firms raise reported EPS by manipulating discretionary accounting accruals before going 
public. Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) find that excessive earnings management can lead to higher 
initial valuations, followed by long-run underperformance. Indeed, Koop and Li (2001) confirm that 
EPS is not an important pricing factor in IPO valuation. In a more recent study, Aggarwal, Bhagat 
and Rangan (2009) therefore use EBITDA in their valuation model as opposed to earlier studies 
that rely on EPS (Koop and Li, 2001; Chen, Heng and Wu, 2002; Peng and Wang, 2007; Luo and 
Ouyang, 2014). 
Industry sector dummy variables take account of differences in the cost of capital and business 
risk across industry sectors. We classify the firms into 12 industry sectors using the two-digit SIC 
level, in line with Koop and Li (2001). In the absence of any stock market trading in the period 
leading up to flotation and any disclosure of objective (audited) estimates of the cost of capital in 
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the flotation prospectus, we use these industry sector dummy variables to reflect the divergent 
business risk. 
Three sets of proxy measures capture earnings potential and growth opportunities that are key 
contributors to IPO value. The first proxy measure is a dummy variable that takes account of 
negative earnings in the accounting period before going public.  Aggarwal, Bhagat and Rangan 
(2009) argue that negative earnings represent valuable future growth opportunities rather than 
current profitability. In their study, firms with higher negative earnings have higher valuations, 
which would appear to be counter-intuitive at first glance from a profitability point of view. The 
amount of R&D spending in the accounting period before going public is the second proxy measure. 
Aggarwal, Bhagat and Rangan (2009), Hertzel, Huson and Parrino (2012) and Deeds, Decarolis and 
Coombs, (1997) use R&D investment to proxy for growth opportunities and hence value driver. Our 
industry sector dummy variables discussed above are the third proxy measure. They take account 
for differences in earnings potential and growth opportunities across various industries. Hunt-
McCool, Koh and Francis (1996), Koop and Li (2001) also control for industry sector affiliation in 
their stochastic frontier model.  
We use book value of assets in the most recent twelve-month accounting period before going 
public as the lower bound for IPO value. Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996), Koop and Li (2001) , 
Chen, Hung and Wu (2002), and Peng and Wang (2007) also include the book value of assets as a 
pricing factor in their value estimations. 
Finally, we use financial leverage, measured by long-term debt divided by book value of assets in 
the accounting period before going public as proxy for risk.  Firms with higher financial distress 
have a greater chance of going bankrupt and hence should have lower valuations. Koop and Li 
(2001) and Peng and Wang (2007) corroborate a negative relationship between leverage and firm 
value.  
 
 
3.2. Underpricing factors 
 
Existing research explains persistent average initial return as the outcome of information 
asymmetry on IPO value between issuers, underwriters and different investor segments. Our 
underpricing factors reflect these information asymmetries at various stages of the IPO valuation 
process.   
We include sales and age of the issuing firm to control for ex ante uncertainty surrounding IPO 
value. These variables measure how established a firm is. Smaller firms with lower growth in sales 
and shorter operating history suffer from greater ex ante uncertainty surrounding IPO value. 
Greater ex ante uncertainty forces issuers to underprice IPOs to compensate uninformed investors 
for an adverse selection problem. Uninformed investors end up with a higher proportion of 
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overpriced issues than informed investors who only apply for underpriced IPOs (Rock, 1986; 
Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Accordingly, we use the amount of sales in the most recent twelve-month 
accounting period before going public. Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996), Koop and Li (2001),  
Peng and Wang (2007), and Aggarwal, Bhagat and Rangan (2009) report a positive association 
between sales and IPO value. Firm age, measured in years between the firm's date of foundation 
and the IPO date, has a positive association with IPO value according to the findings of Hunt-
McCool, Koh and Francis (1996). 
We use equity retained by pre-IPO shareholders after the issue, proceeds raised at the disposal 
of the issuing firm, the commitment of pre-IPO shareholders not to sell additional shares 
immediately in the aftermath of the issue, and underwriting fees as proxy measures for ex ante 
uncertainty surrounding the deal characteristics. It is not unreasonable to assume that firm insiders 
know more about future firm prospects than outside investors (Akerlof, 1970). Firm insiders can 
transmit costly and difficult to imitate signals to convey firm value to outside investors (Spence, 
1973). We use Leland and Pyle’s (1977) equity retained by pre-IPO shareholders in the post-IPO 
firm jointly with proceeds at the disposal of the issuer as signal in which firm insiders transmit 
information on firm value to outside investors. The impact of these signalling variables on the 
stochastic frontier price is inconclusive. Some studies find a relationship whereas other studies 
report insignificant results or omit these signalling variables altogether. Our study therefore seeks 
to re-examine the importance of these signalling variables. The proportion of equity retained is a 
costly signal because owners forgo the possibility of achieving diversification of their personal 
investment portfolio. Various conceptual frameworks use equity retained as signal to reduce 
information asymmetry surrounding firm value (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Welch, 1989; Allen 
and Faulhaber, 1989). Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996) report a positive relationship between 
equity retained and estimated offer price. Van der Goot and Roosenboom (2005) show a positive 
association between management stock ownership and market capitalization.  Aggarwal, Bhagat 
and Rangan (2009) find a negative relationship between insider retention and offer value. Chen, 
Hung and Wu (2002) do not find a statistically significant relationship. Koop and Li (2001) and Luo 
and Ouyang (2014) omit equity retention as a signalling variable in their stochastic frontier model.  
The amount of IPO proceeds at the disposal of the issuing firm is an effective signal, perhaps of 
investment plans, for example. Studies normally use proceeds at the disposal of the issuing firm in 
conjunction with equity retained by pre-IPO owners as a joint signal of firm value (Downes and 
Heinkel, 1982; Ritter 1984b; Kim and Weisbach, 2008). Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996) 
report a positive relationship between proceeds and offer price, while Peng and Wang (2007) 
report a negative association between the amount of money raised and pricing inefficiency. Koop 
and Li (2001), Chen, Hung and Wu (2002) and Aggarwal, Bhagat and Rangan (2009) omit proceeds 
as a signalling variable in their stochastic frontier models.  
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We use a dummy variable to account for the presence of lock-in agreements. The impact of lock-
in agreements on prices in a stochastic frontier framework awaits investigation. A lock-in 
agreement is a commitment that prohibits firm insiders from selling shares in the aftermarket for a 
specified period. Demand in IPO shares with a lock-in agreement should be higher than offers 
without such an agreement. Investors are more willing to buy an IPO knowing that they have a 
reduced moral hazard problem during the period in which firm insiders cannot sell their equity 
stakes. This argument is in line with the findings of Brav and Gompers (2003) and Arthurs, 
Busenitz, Hoskisson and Johnson (2009). The supply of tradable shares increases only following the 
lock-in expiration, which could potentially have a negative impact on share prices (Bradley, Jordan, 
Ha-Chin and Roten, 2001; Field and Hanka, 2001). In the US, the lock-in period can be as short as 90 
days and as long as two years.  
We use underwriting expenses as a proxy for the riskiness of an IPO. Underwriter compensation 
is likely to be a function of information costs and deal characteristics (Hughes, 1986). Fees will be 
higher for those IPOs about which relatively little public information is available such as, for 
example, less well-established and younger firms. Accordingly, various studies use underwriter 
expenses as proxy for ex ante uncertainty surrounding the deal characteristics. In a stochastic 
frontier framework, Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996) report a negative association between 
underwriter compensation and estimated offer price. In contrast, Koop and Li (2001) report a 
positive relationship between fees and market capitalization at the offer price. Neither of the two 
studies simultaneously control for underwriting fees and underwriter reputation. Chen, Hung and 
Wu (2002) and Aggarwal, Bhagat and Rangan (2009) do not take account of underwriting expenses 
in their analysis. We therefore provide further evidence on the simultaneous effect of underwriter 
fees and reputation to shed light on earlier mixed findings.  
We use logarithm of one plus the number of uses of IPO proceeds disclosed in the flotation 
prospectus as proxy of ex ante uncertainty surrounding firm value. This measure is to some extent 
endogenous and hence we simultaneously control for deal characteristics. The number of uses of 
proceeds is a function of offer size, the proportion of the proceeds at the disposal of the firm and 
the proceeds going to selling pre-IPO shareholders. Therefore, a simple count of the number of uses 
of proceeds without controlling for offer size and the proportion of funds at the disposal of the 
issuer is unlikely to be informative and can lead to contradictory findings in a cross-sectional 
analysis. For example, Beatty and Ritter (1986) report a positive association between the number 
of uses of proceeds and underpricing. In contrast, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Leone, Rock 
and Willenborg (2007) find that more specific disclosure leads to lower underpricing. The absence 
of the number of uses of proceeds from studies using SFA to explain deliberate underpricing allows 
us to extend the literature.  
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We use underwriter reputation, private-equity and/or venture capital backing as third-party 
certification of ex ante uncertainty to endorse IPO value. Underwriter reputation employs Loughran 
and Ritter’s (2004) ranking of investment banks in tombstone advertisements of IPO prospectuses. 
Regular updates on underwriter reputation are available from Jay Ritter’s web site. These updates 
allow for variation in underwriter reputation across different investment banks and time periods. 
Reputation capital and the corresponding ranking can improve, deteriorate or remain unchanged. 
We believe that tombstone rankings are perhaps the most meaningful indicators of reputation 
capital. Firstly, the rankings in tombstone advertisements most closely reflect underwriter activity 
in the IPO market. Underwriter rankings have not previously been used in SFA applications to 
explain deliberate premarket underpricing. Secondly, market share (see, for example, Megginson 
and Weiss, 1991; Beatty, Bunsis and Hand, 1998; Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001; Chemmanur and 
Paeglis, 2005), is a more ambiguous definition of reputation since it involves a trade-off between 
using aggregate number of IPOs or aggregate offer size as the basis for any rankings.  Thirdly, 
underwriter fees (see, for example Booth and Smith, 1986; Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis, 1996; 
Koop and Li, 2001) may not be a representative proxy of reputation capital given the sample period 
under investigation. Hsuan-Chi and Ritter (2000) provide evidence that underwriting fees are 
clustered around 7% for firm-commitment offers during the late 1990s, which overlaps with our 
sample period. Any deviation from 7% is therefore likely to be associated with differences in the 
risk of a deal rather than a reflection of the reputation capital of underwriters.  
We employ a dummy variable to capture IPOs with private equity backing and/or venture 
capital backing. Our study is the first analysis to test the impact of private equity and/or venture 
capital backing on the deliberate premarket underpricing in a stochastic frontier context. 
Disentangling the relative impact of private equity backing and/or venture capital backing on 
deliberate underpricing is important because of the mixed results reported in the literature 
explaining initial return. On the one hand, some studies claim that private equity backing and/or 
venture capital backing endorses firm value and reduces initial return (see, for example, Barry, 
Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lerner, 1994; Brav and 
Gompers, 1997; Nahata, 2008; Arthurs, Busenitz, Hoskisson and Johnson, 2009; Bartling and Park, 
2009; Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis and Singh, 2011; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, 2013). Furthermore, 
younger venture capital backed IPOs have, on average, higher initial return than those IPOs that 
have more established venture capital backing (Gompers, 1996). On the other hand, Liu and Ritter 
(2011) report that venture capital backed IPOs have higher initial return when they have coverage 
from more reputable analysts.  
We use aggregate IPO number and aggregate average initial return to take account of new issues 
market conditions at the time of flotation. Data on aggregate IPO number and aggregate average 
initial return are available from Jay Ritter’s web site. We follow Yung, Çolak and Wei’s (2008) 
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approach to discriminate between ‘hot’, ‘cold’ and ‘normal’ new issues market activity. ‘Hot market 
activity’ is when the number of IPOs in a quarter is 50% greater than the three-monthly moving 
average. ‘Cold market activity’ is when the number of IPOs in a quarter is 50% smaller than the 
three-monthly moving average. All other quarters fall into the category of ‘normal’ new issues 
market activity. Our analysis is the first study to include new issues market conditions in a 
stochastic frontier framework to test the impact on deliberate underpricing. We include aggregate 
IPO number and aggregate average initial return because Lowry (2004), Loughran and Ritter 
(2004), Brailsford, Heaney and Shi (2009), and Yung, Çolak and Wei (2008) identify two stylised 
facts about these measures. Firstly, the number of IPOs and average initial return are highly 
autocorrelated. Secondly, the correlation between the two series is positive. 
Finally, we use the change in real private nonresidential fixed investment as proxy for private 
firms’ demand for capital. We use the same approach as above to discriminate between ‘hot’, ‘cold’ 
and ‘normal’ periods for demand for capital. The impact of this variable on deliberate underpricing 
in a stochastic frontier analysis awaits investigation. Yung, Çolak and Wei (2008) measure 
investment opportunities directly via the change in real private nonresidential fixed investment 
rather than indirectly via financial statements at firm level to infer the value of investment 
opportunities.  Firm attributes or deal characteristics do not sufficiently differ to fully account for 
the IPO cycles (Ritter, 1984a; Lowry and Schwert, 2002; Loughran and Ritter, 2004). Yung, Çolak 
and Wei (2008) demonstrate that exogenous shocks to the value of private firms’ investment 
opportunities can lead to more active IPO markets with more low quality issuers going public than 
the average pre-shock issuing firm. These exogenous shocks can therefore lead to waves with 
heightened dispersion in firm quality, higher information asymmetry surrounding firm value and 
hence higher average initial return during ‘hot’ IPO markets. 
 
4. Early aftermarket trading  
 
In addition to information asymmetry surrounding IPO value between market participants in the 
primary market, the literature attributes persistent average initial return also to early aftermarket 
trading activity (see, for example, Chen, Hung and Wu, 2002; Ellis 2006; Agarwal, 2003). Persistent 
deliberate underpricing in the primary market creates excess demand in the aftermarket when IPO 
shares become available for trading. This excess demand will push up prices to a new equilibrium 
and allows selling shareholders in the secondary market to earn significant returns. We refer to the 
difference between the market price and the 'fair' offer price as mispricing in the aftermarket. Five 
variables explain mispricing in the early aftermarket. 
The number of shares traded on the first day as percentage of shares offered serves as a proxy 
variable to take account of the trading volume and excess demand of IPOs in the aftermarket. 
Existing research reports of a positive association between initial return and trading volume in the 
 15 
aftermarket (Aggarwal, 2000, 2003; Chahine, 2007; Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara, 2000, 2002; Ellis, 
2006). 
Two dummy variables capture the aftermarket demand in IPO shares via the price revision from 
the initial filing range to the offer price (Hanley, 1993) as an indicator of the likelihood of flipping 
taking place. We code dummy variables equal to one if the offer price is above or below the initial 
filing price range. More investors buy or sell shares if shares are offered above or below the initial 
filing price range. Ellis (2006) observes a significant association between these two dummy 
variables and trading volume.  
Equity retention by pre-IPO owners immediately after flotation serves as a proxy measure for 
ownership concentration. Average initial return is attributable to a signalling effect by firm insiders 
to outside investors. Chen, Hung and Wu (2002) report a negative association between ownership 
concentration and aftermarket mispricing. 
Underwriter reputation captures distribution networks and institutional contacts. Ellis (2006) 
reports greater trading volumes for more reputable underwriters. The author argues that higher 
quality underwriters have a greater ability to generate interest among investors through  more 
established distribution networks and institutional contacts. In addition, more reputable 
underwriters have a higher reputation capital at stake and hence are more likely to provide price 
support in the aftermarket. 
Offer size captures the risk of an IPO. Investors perceive smaller IPOs as riskier compared to 
larger new issues of more established companies. Beatty and Ritter (1986), Ritter (1987), and 
Carter (1992) observe a negative association between offer size and initial return. 
 
5. Data and methods 
 
5.1. Data 
 
Our initial source is the New Issues database in Thomson One Banker, from which we obtain 
3,131 observations with all relevant variables on U.S. IPOs from January 1980 to December 2012. 
This sample excludes closed-end funds, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), Master Limited 
Partnerships (MLPs), Real Estate Investment Trusts, unit offers, all new issues with an offer price 
below $5, and IPOs with an offer price greater than $1000. Data items we obtain from Thomson 
One include issuing firm attributes, deal characteristics, and aftermarket trading data. We use 
financial statement data from Compustat and trading data for each IPO firm from the Centre for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to complement our variables list and fill in missing price 
observations in Thomson One.9 Jay Ritter's web site provides the rankings on underwriter 
                                                        
9 Key financial statement data leading up to flotation was missing for many firms in Thomson One and 
Compustat.  
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reputation and aggregate data on the new equity issues market. The Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis is our last data source which supplies data on private non-residential fixed investment across 
the sample period to identify firms' demand for private capital. Our sample excludes observations 
with missing values on the variables of interest.  
 
 
Figure 2 graphs number of IPOs against average initial return for our sample. Overall, the cyclicity 
is representative of the data reported on Jay Ritter's web site. 
 
Figure 2: Average initial return and number of U.S. IPOs by quarterly intervals, 19802012 
 
Average initial return per quarter is the equally-weighted mean of the percentage change from the offer price in the 
premarket to the aftermarket price. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 shows the sample distribution of IPOs across our industry sector classification at the two-
digit SIC level. Both the number of IPOs and average initial return differ across industry sectors. 
There is no perfect correlation between the number of IPOs and average initial return. 'Computers' 
has the highest concentration in terms of the number of offers as well as the highest average initial 
return. 'Utilities' has the lowest concentration of new issues, while 'Oil and Gas' record the lowest 
average initial return across the sectors. 
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Table 1: IPO sample distribution across industry sectors 
 
Our sample consists of 3,131 offers between 1980 and 2012, classified into Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) sectors 
corresponding to Koop and Li’s (2001) industry classification. 
 
Industry Two-digit SIC codes Number  
of IPOs 
Average Initial 
return (%) 
Chemical Product 28 199 9.436 
Communications 48 115 16.050 
Computers 35,73 754 34.939 
Electronic Equipment 36 239 27.858 
Financial Services 60-65, 67 238 14.844 
Health 80 89 9.466 
Manufacturing 30-34 115 15.945 
Oil and Gas 13,29 97 5.500 
Retail 53,54,56,57,59 209 11.053 
Scientific Instruments 38 199 16.345 
Transportation 37, 39, 40-42, 44, 45 157 11.978 
Utilities 49 56 9.188 
All Others 1, 2, 7, 10, 12, 14,… 664 12.872 
Total  3131 19.085 
 
 
5.2. Definition and measurement of variables 
 
Table 2 lists the variables, their definitions and measurements as well as the corresponding data 
sources. Offer price per share is the primary variable of interest  We employ several pricing factors 
as the primary value driver for equity. Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization 
is the proxy measure for a more long-term stream of operating cash flow because the latter is 
subject to higher annual volatility. Industry dummy variables reflect Koop and Li's (2001) 12 
industry sectors based on Fama and French's (1997) two-digit classification. These industry sector 
dummy variables take account of differences in the cost of capital, business risk, future earnings 
potential, and growth opportunities of IPO firms across industries. A dummy variable captures 
negative earnings in the accounting period before going public as a proxy for future growth 
opportunities rather than current profitability. We also include historic R&D spending as an 
indicator for future growth opportunities. Book value of assets in the most recent twelve-month 
accounting period before going public acts as the lower bound for IPO value. Financial leverage is 
the last pricing factor and measures financial distress of firms.  
We use various factors to explain variations in deliberate premarket underpricing. Issuing 
firm attributes that take account of ex ante uncertainty include sales in the accounting period 
before flotation and firm age. In addition to firm attributes, we include several deal characteristics 
as proxy measures to explain deliberate premarket underpricing. They include equity retained by 
pre-IPO shareholders after the issue, proceeds raised at the disposal of the issuing firm, the 
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commitment of pre-IPO owners not to sell additional shares immediately in the aftermath of the 
issue, underwriting fees, and logarithm of one plus the number of uses of proceeds disclosed in the 
Table 2: Variable definitions, measurements and data sources 
 
This table presents the definitions of the dependent and independent variables used in the SFA model and the later model 
for aftermarket mispricing. For the SFA model, offer price per share is the variable of primary interest. Pricing factors and 
underpricing factors are the independent variables. The pricing factors represent the primary value drivers of equity. The 
underpricing factors explain the deliberate premarket underpricing and these include proxy variables relating to issuing 
firm attributes, deal (offer) characteristics, third-party certification, new issues market conditions, and private firms' 
demand for capital. For the aftermarket mispricing model, the dependent variable is aftermarket mispricing retrieved 
after estimation of the SFA model. This aftermarket mispricing component is explained by a number of variables proxying 
trading volume, likelihood of flipping, ownership concentration, underwriter reputation and offer risk. Data sources 
include Thomson One Banker, Compustat, Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), Jay Ritter's web site 
[http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm], Fama and French's (1997) industry sector classification, and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
Variables used in the Stochastic Frontier Model Source 
Dependent Variable 
Offer price  Offer price per share in US$. Thomson 
Pricing Factors 
EBITDA  Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) in US$ million in 
the accounting period before IPO. 
Compustat 
Industry 
dummies 
 Industry sector dummy variables as proxy variables for differences in the cost of capital 
and earnings potential between industry sectors, based on Fama and French’s (1997) 
industry classification at the two-digit level to discriminate between IPOs coming from 
12 different industry sectors in line with Koop and Li (2001). 
Fama and French 
(1997), Koop and Li 
(2001) 
Negative net 
income 
 Dummy variable coded one if the firm has a negative net income in the accounting 
period before going public, else coded zero.  
Compustat 
 Capital 
expenditure 
 R&D investment in US$ million in the accounting period before IPO. Compustat 
Assets  Total assets in US$ million in the accounting period before IPO. Thomson,  Compustat 
Leverage  Long-term debt scaled by book values of total assets in the accounting period before 
IPO. 
Compustat 
Underpricing Factors 
Issuing firm attributes  
Sales  Sales in US$ million in the accounting period before IPO. Compustat 
Firm Age  Number of years between the date the company was founded and the IPO date. Compustat 
Deal (offer) characteristics  
Equity 
retained 
 Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signal of equity retained:                  , where RET 
is the proportion of equity retained by pre-IPO shareholders in the post-IPO firm. 
Thomson 
Proceeds  Proceeds in US$ million at the disposal of the issuing firm, measured by the number of 
primary shares times the offer price per share in US$.  
Thomson 
Lock-in  Dummy variable coded one if the flotation prospectus discloses the presence of a ‘lock-
in’ agreement, else coded zero. 
Thomson 
Fees  Underwriting fees in US$ million.  Thomson 
ln(1 + 
number of 
uses of 
proceeds) 
 Logarithm of one plus the number of uses of IPO proceeds disclosed in the flotation 
prospectus. 
Thomson 
Third-party certification  
Reputation  Underwriter reputation based on tombstone rankings used in Carter and Manaster 
(1990), Carter and Dark (1993) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998). Updated rankings 
are available from Jay Ritter’s web page. 
Jay Ritter’s IPO 
website 
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VC/PE 
backing 
 Dummy variable coded one if pre-IPO venture capitalists and/or private equity 
investors retain a stake in the post-IPO firm, else coded zero. 
Thomson 
IPO market conditions  
‘Hot’ or 
‘cold’ market 
activity 
 Two dummy variables capture IPO market activity during ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ markets. ‘Hot 
market activity’ is coded one if the number of IPOs in a quarter is 50% greater than the 
three-monthly moving average. ‘Cold market activity’ is coded one if the number of IPOs 
in a quarter is 50% smaller than the three-monthly moving average. All other quarters 
fall into the ‘normal market activity’ and coded as zero. 
Jay Ritter’s IPO 
website 
‘Hot’ or 
‘cold’ market 
underpricing 
 Two dummy variables capture IPO market underpricing during ‘hot’ or ‘cold’ markets. 
‘Hot market underpricing’ is coded one if the average IPO underpricing in a quarter is 
50% greater than the three-monthly moving average. ‘Cold market underpricing’ is 
coded one if the average IPO underpricing in a quarter is 50% smaller than the three-
monthly moving average. All other quarters fall into the ‘normal’ underpricing category 
and coded zero. 
Jay Ritter’s IPO 
website 
Private firms’ demand for capital  
‘Hot’ or 
‘cold’ 
demand for 
capital 
 Two dummy variables capture private firms’ demand for capital during ‘hot’ or ‘cold 
markets. ‘Hot demand for capital’ is coded one if the quarterly percentage change in real 
private nonresidential fixed investment is 50% greater than the three-monthly moving 
average. ‘Cold demand for capital’ is coded one if the quarterly percentage change in 
real private nonresidential fixed investment is 50% smaller than the three-monthly 
moving average. 
Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis 
Variables used in Aftermarket Mispricing Model 
Dependent Variable 
Aftermarket 
Mispricing 
Aftermarket mispricing component of  initial returns recovered after estimation of 
deliberate underpricing 
Authors’ calculations 
Independent Variable 
Trading volume  
% of shares 
traded 
 The number of shares traded on the IPO day divided by the total number of shares in 
the offer. 
 
CRSP,  Thomson  
 Likelihood of flipping  
Above filing 
range 
 Dummy variable equal to one if the offer price is above the initial filing price range, else 
coded zero. 
 
Thomson 
 
Below filing 
range 
 Dummy variable equal to one if the offer price is below the initial filing price range, else 
coded zero. 
Thomson 
Ownership concentration  
Equity 
retained 
 Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signal of equity retained:                  , where RET 
is the proportion of equity retained by pre-IPO shareholders in the post-IPO firm. 
Thomson 
Underwriter Reputation  
Reputation  Underwriter reputation based on tombstone rankings used in Carter and Manaster 
(1990), Carter and Dark (1993) and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998). Updated rankings 
are available from Jay Ritter’s web page. 
Thomson, Jay Ritter's 
IPO website 
Offer risk  
Offer size  Total number of shares offered in the IPO multiplied by the offer price. Thomson 
 
flotation prospectus. Furthermore, we use third-party certification to explain deliberate premarket 
underpricing. Underwriter reputation rankings are available from Jay Ritter's web site. We use the 
average rank of underwriters for those IPO deals that have more than one underwriter. A dummy 
variable captures IPOs with private equity backing and/or venture capital backing. To account for 
IPO market conditions, we use Yung, Çolak and Wei's (2008) approach to classify aggregate IPO 
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number and aggregate average initial return into 'hot', 'cold' and 'normal' new issues market 
activity. Finally, we use the same classification approach for private firms’ demand for capital.  
We also employ several proxy variables to explain aftermarket mispricing. Trading volume 
captures the demand in shares, defined as the number of shares traded on the first day as a 
percentage of shares offered. To capture the likelihood of flipping shares in the early aftermarket, 
we create two dummy variables indicating if the offer price is below or above the initial filing price 
range. Equity retained by pre-IPO owners after flotation measures ownership concentration. 
Underwriter ranking measures the reputation capital at stake. More reputable underwriters are 
more likely to provide price support in the aftermarket. We also control for offer size to capture the 
riskiness of an IPO. Smaller offers are normally riskier and hence have higher levels of initial return. 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the sample of 3,131 IPOs between January 1980 and 
December 2012.  The small difference between the mean offer price and the median offer price 
suggests that the distribution of the dependent variable is close to symmetric.  Although the 
average EBITDA is positive, the range between the minimum and maximum is large. Interestingly, 
no fewer than 695 companies in our sample disclose negative earnings in the accounting period 
leading up to flotation. Obtaining a stock market listing is therefore not exclusively reserved for 
profitable companies. For example, General Motors has the single largest loss amounting to $4,431 
million. Sample firms have an average R&D investment of $21.3 million in the accounting period 
before flotation. The distribution of capital expenditure is positively skewed with a large range 
between the minimum and maximum amount spent. The average book value of total assets for the 
sample firms is $479 million, ranging between a minimum of $181,000 and a maximum of $217,380 
million. Some sample firms have no debt in their capital structure, whereas the maximum financial 
leverage is close to one at the time of flotation. 
Average sales amount to $298 million. The distribution of sales is positively skewed and has a 
standard deviation of $2,177 million. On average, IPO firms are 18 years old. Pre-IPO shareholders 
retain about 68% of the shares at flotation. Some of the original owners sell their entire stake at 
flotation, whereas others retain a significant proportion of their shares in the post-IPO firm. The 
average IPO proceeds at the disposal of the firm is $92.9 million. The majority of IPO firms in our 
sample have a lock-in agreement in which original shareholders declare not to sell any shares 
immediately following the flotation. On average, underwriting fees amount to $1.1 million. Firms 
disclose an average of two uses of proceeds in the flotation prospectus. Average underwriter 
reputation using Carter and Manaster's (1980) methodology based on tombstone rankings of 
investment banks is 7.6. Only about 12% of firms in our sample have venture capital and/or private 
equity backing. 
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The majority of our sample firms have their IPO during normal new issues market activity, 
average aggregate levels of initial return, and average demand for private capital. The average offer 
price is neither above nor below the initial filing price range. On average, the amount of the offer 
size in our sample is $108.1 million. 
Table 3: Summary statistics  
This table presents summary statistics for 3,131 IPOs between January 1980 and December 2012. See Table 2 for 
definitions of the variables presented here. 
 
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Offer Price ($) 13.508 13 5.814 5.100 100 
EBITDA ($million) 37.972 4.961 362.330 -4431.000 17121 
Negative net income 0.222 0 0.416 0 1 
Capital Expenditure ($million) 21.321 2.148 153.225 0.004 5431 
Assets ($million) 479.449 37.866 4906.155 0.181 217380 
Leverage 0.265 0.196 0.247 0 0.999 
Sales ($million) 298.303 45.074 2176.969 0.007 104589 
Firm Age (years) 18.321 9 22.921 1 165 
Equity Retained 0.684 0.711 0.166 0 0.992 
Proceeds ($million) 92.857 39 356.253 2.100 16006.877 
Lock-in Dummy 0.674 1 0.469 0 1 
Fees ($million) 1.118 0.590 1.920 0.005 35.215 
Number of Uses of Proceeds 2.017 1 1.761 0 11 
Reputation 7.607 8.001 1.769 0 9.001 
VC/PE Backing 0.118 0 0.323 0 1 
Hot Market Activity 0.042 0 0.200 0 1 
Cold Market Activity 0.019 0 0.138 0 1 
Hot Market Underpricing 0.075 0 0.264 0 1 
Cold Market Underpricing 0.086 0 0.281 0 1 
Hot Demand for Private Capital 0.259 0 0.438 0 1 
Cold Demand for Private Capital 0.257 0 0.437 0 1 
% Shares Traded 72.525 59.708 55.516 0 516.576 
Above Filing Range 0.167 0 0.373 0 1 
Below Filing Range 0.168 0 0.374 0 1 
Offer Size ($million) 108.099 41.600 564.617 2.300 23900 
 
 
5.3. Estimating “fair” offer prices: Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
 
We use Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) to estimate the fair offer price for each of the IPOs. SFA, a 
parametric technique originally proposed independently by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and 
Meeusen and Van Den Broeck (1977), allows us to estimate the frontier of (unobserved) maximum 
“fair” offer prices that would prevail in the absence of information asymmetry. We write the IPO 
price stochastic frontier as: 
 
uvXfOP  )(     (1) 
 
where OP is the observed offer price, X is a vector of observed characteristics (pricing factors) that 
affect the firm’s offer price and   is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The term )( Xf  
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captures the deterministic part of the relationship between offer price and the pricing factors. 
Random factors can cause deviations of the actual offer price from the deterministic frontier and is 
captured by the term v which is assumed to have a normal distribution, hence producing the 
stochastic frontier, which is the offer pricing level that the firm seeks to attain. If actual offer prices 
are systematically below the optimal frontier offer price offer, due to, for example information 
asymmetry, then this is reflected by the term u, which is commonly assumed to have a one-sided 
distribution.10 This term u captures the degree of deliberate premarket underpricing. As a 
parametric estimation method, SFA can separate out the two-sided noise from the one-sided 
component in the estimation of the IPO frontier, hence allowing us to estimate deliberate 
premarket underpricing.  
An important development in the SFA literature, but less frequently explored in empirical 
applications, is the modelling of exogenous factors that affect the distance from the frontier. Given a 
fairly large literature focused on explaining the drivers of IPO underpricing, we incorporate these 
underpricing factors into the frontier model and explicitly model the conditional variance or 
heteroscedasticity of the one-sided error term when fitting the IPO offer price frontier (see 
Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). Given the normal-half-normal distribution assumed on the combined 
error component, the one-sided error variance is modelled simultaneously with the frontier as 
),0(~ 2
iu
Nu   and ),0(~ 2vNv  : 
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where Z is a vector capturing the various underpricing factors, and   is a vector of parameters to 
be estimated. In the case where the variances of both error components are constant, equation (1) 
is estimated through maximum likelihood techniques on the following log-likelihood function:  
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where (.);;;)( 22  


 iii
v
u
vus Xyσ  is the cumulative distribution function 
of the standard normal distribution. If either or both variances are non-constant, as in equation (2), 
u  or/and v will be replaced with )exp(
2 iZσ i   in the above log-likelihood function. Once the 
frontier is estimated, we can construct measures of the distance of observed offer price from fair 
offer price as: 
                                                        
10 While the half-normal distribution is most commonly used, alternatives such as the exponential, gamma 
and truncated normal distributions have also been used for the simple stochastic frontier model. 
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We can then construct the measure of underpricing (UP), i.e. the proportionate distance of actual 
offer price from the theoretical frontier offer price: 
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i   is the density for the standard normal distribution and 
other terms are as defined earlier.  
 
 
In addition to estimating the stochastic frontier model in equation (1) and simultaneously 
modelling the determinants of underpricing in equation (2) in one step, we also calculate and 
report an R-squared measure developed recently by Liu and Meyers (2009) that summarises the 
overall explanatory power of the determinants of inefficiency  (underpricing in our case). Liu and 
Meyers (2009) propose that this measure )(
2
ZR   is calculated as follows: 
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where Eˆ  and Vˆ  are sample estimates of the mean and variance of the deliberate underpricing 
component iu  conditional on its determinants iZ . These two components are constructed as 
follows: 
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Hence, once we have obtained estimates iˆ  and iˆ , equation (6) can be calculated and 
interpreted as the fraction of the sample variation in u that can be explained by Z, similar to the 
goodness of fit measure from the traditional R-squared in an OLS regression,   
 
6. Findings 
 
6.1. 'Pricing factors' to estimate the maximum achievable offer price 
 
We use an extended set of pricing factors to estimate the maximum (fair) achievable offer price 
compared to the ones used in previous studies. This approach allows us to provide more precise 
estimates of fair offer prices and hence better estimates of deliberate premarket underpricing as 
well as aftermarket mispricing. Table 4, Panel A, presents the frontier parameter estimates, which 
are corrected for heteroscedasticity in the one-sided error term. The majority of the pricing factors 
are statistically significant in explaining the maximum achievable offer price across our models 
with the exception of some industry dummy variables.  
The coefficients on earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) are 
positive and statistically significant across all models. Our results therefore corroborate earlier 
evidence on the importance of EBITDA as a value driver, such as, for example, Teoh, Welch and 
Wong (1998), Koop and Li (2001), Chen, Heng and Wu (2002), and Aggarwal, Bhagat and Rangan 
(2009). 
We retain all industry dummy variables across our models to account for differences in the cost 
of capital and business risk in line with Koop and Li's (2001) sector classification. Our findings 
show that sectors such as computers, communications, retail and financial services have, on 
average, higher offer prices, whereas manufacturing has, on average, lower offer prices compared 
to the base sectors. Whether offer price in the remaining sectors are higher or lower on average 
compared to the base category is not clear-cut and depends on model complexity. 
We use a binary indicator of negative net income and the amount of capital expenditure during 
the accounting period leading up to an IPO to proxy future earnings potential as well as growth 
opportunities. Firms with a negative net income in the year prior to IPO have, on average, lower 
valuations. We therefore conclude that this dummy variable is more likely to capture the impact of 
current profitability rather than future growth opportunities as Aggarwal, Bhagat and Rangan 
(2009) advocate. Higher capital expenditure is a significant positive value driver. Our findings 
corroborate earlier claims that historic R&D spending is an important indicator for future growth 
opportunities as reported in studies such as, for example, Aggarwal, Bhagat and Rangan (2009), 
Hertzel, Huson and Parrino (2012), and Deeds, Decarolis and Coombs (1997). 
Firms with a higher asset base on average, have higher valuations. Our findings are intuitive in 
that the book value of assets represents a lower bound for IPO value. The studies of Hunt-McCool, 
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Koh and Francis (1996) and Koop and Li (2001), and Peng and Wang (2007) provide further 
evidence in support of our findings. Therefore, we do not support Chen, Hung and Wu's (2002) 
claim that potential growth and hence IPO value is lower for firms with a greater asset base at the 
time of a flotation. 
Issuers with higher levels of financial leverage at the IPO have, on average, lower offer prices 
because of greater risk and distress costs. Lower valuations reflect an increased probability of firms 
going into bankruptcy as a result of greater financial risk. Our findings corroborate those reported 
in Koop and Li (2001) and Peng and Wang (2007). 
 
6.2. Factors explaining deliberate premarket underpricing 
  
We explain deliberate premarket underpricing as a result of information asymmetries between 
new issues market participants at various stages leading up to an IPO, while holding the 'pricing 
factors' constant. Panel B presents six models in which we introduce our proxy variables block by 
block to capture information asymmetries at various stages of an IPO process. Across all these 
models, we report the R-squared measure for the explanatory power of the determinants of 
underpricing (RZ2) as captured in equation (6). The R-squared is reasonably high across models (2) 
to (6), converging at around 58%, indicating that the variables we have used as determinants of 
underpricing can explain quite a large fraction of the variation in our estimates of underpricing.11 
Model 1 explains underpricing as a function of ex ante uncertainty surrounding firm value (Rock, 
1986; Beatty and Ritter, 1986). Ex ante uncertainty captures how established firms are before 
taking into account any IPO deal characteristics. Sales in the accounting period before going public 
and firm age, measured in years between the date of incorporation and the IPO date, are the two 
proxy variables to capture ex ante uncertainty. Both the coefficient for sales and firm age are 
inconsistent with the ex ante uncertainty argument. The coefficient for sales is statistically 
insignificant, while firm age has a positive relationship with underpricing. We conclude that the 
amount of sales is perhaps less likely to capture the level of ex ante uncertainty as reported 
elsewhere in the IPO literature that relies on the aggregate initial return rather than the deliberate 
premarket underpricing. Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996), Koop and Li (2001) and Aggarwal, 
Bhagat and Rangan (2009) report a positive association between sales and IPO value. Firm age also 
does not appear to capture the ex ante uncertainty with respect to deliberate premarket 
underpricing as reported elsewhere in the literature. Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996) show a 
positive correlation between firm age and IPO value. 
Model 2 augments Model 1 with variables on deal characteristics for each IPO. We only find 
partial support for a joint signalling effect of equity retained by pre-IPO owners in the post-IPO firm 
                                                        
11 To the best of our knowledge, there is no study that reports this specific measure of R-squared in the 
context of a one-stage stochastic frontier model investigating the determinants of underpricing. 
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and the proceeds at the disposal of the issuer (Downes and Heinkel, 1982; Ritter, 1984b; Kim and 
Weisback, 2008). While the coefficient for proceeds has the correct sign and is statistically 
significant, the coefficient for equity retained is statistically insignificant. Our findings therefore 
present evidence that equity retained is an unlikely signalling mechanism to convey firm value to 
outside investors. Previous studies which have used related SFA frameworks to examine the 
relationship between equity retained and estimated offer value report a positive association (Hunt-
McCool, Koh and Francis, 1996), no association (Chen, Hung and Wu, 2002), or omit the variable 
altogether (Koop and Li, 2001). Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996) also report a positive 
association between proceeds and offer price. Peng and Wang (2007) report a negative relationship 
between proceeds and pricing inefficiency. Other studies, including those of Koop and Li (2001) 
and Chen, Hung and Wu (2002) do not include proceeds as a joint signalling variable. 
The impact of lock-in agreements on underpricing in a SFA framework awaits investigation. Our 
findings show that the presence of lock-in agreements by pre-IPO owners increases the level of 
uncertainty and hence underpricing. The supply of tradable shares can increase at the time when 
the lock-in period expires. Our evidence therefore corroborates the findings of existing studies such 
as, for example, Bradley, Jordan, Ha-Chin and Roten (2001), and Field and Hanka (2001). 
The coefficient for underwriter fees is positive and statistically significant. We can conclude that 
fees will be higher for those IPOs about which relatively little public information is available and 
hence these exhibit higher levels of underpricing. Our findings are in line and hence corroborate the 
evidence reported in Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996). They report a negative association 
between underwriter compensation and estimated offer price. In contrast, Koop and Li (2001) 
report a positive relationship between fees and offer price. However, their result could reflect less 
competition in the corresponding underwriting market. Neither Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis 
(1996), nor Koop and Li (2001) control simultaneously for underwriter reputation in their analysis. 
We find a positive relationship between the logarithm of the number of uses of proceeds and 
underpricing. A greater number of uses of proceeds increases the ex ante uncertainty and hence 
also the underpricing. The number of uses of proceeds has not attracted any attention in the 
existing literature using SFA. Our findings are consistent with those of Beatty and Ritter (1986). 
They do not distinguish between deliberate premarket underpricing and aftermarket mispricing. 
Since the number of uses of proceeds is endogenous we simultaneously control for other deal 
characteristics. 
Adding the deal characteristics in Model 2 and subsequent models brings about significant 
positive coefficients for sales as well as negative coefficients for firm age. A positive coefficient for 
sales contradicts the ex-ante uncertainty argument. One possible explanation of this unexpected 
result is that higher levels of sales may make future growth opportunities more difficult and hence 
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uncertain. Older firms now have a reduced underpricing which is consistent with the ex ante 
uncertainty argument.  
Model 3 augments Model 2 with underwriter reputation and private-equity and/or venture 
capital backing as proxy variables to capture third-party certification, to reduce ex ante uncertainty 
and hence underpricing. On the one hand, our findings cannot detect any relationship between 
underwriter reputation and underpricing. More reputable underwriters can therefore neither take 
advantage of a principal-agent relationship (Baron, 1982), nor do they play a third-party 
certification role (Carter and Manaster, 1990). We therefore conclude that underwriter reputation 
does not impact on the level of deliberate premarket underpricing as reported elsewhere in the 
literature that employs initial return without any segregation. On the other hand, private equity 
backing and/or venture capital backing adds to the explanatory power of underpricing. The 
coefficient for this third-party certification dummy variable is positive and statistically significant. 
Our study is the first to provide such evidence in a SFA framework. Our findings therefore support 
Liu and Ritter's (2011) claim that venture capital backed IPOs have higher underpricing as a result 
of attracting more coverage from analysts.     
In the remaining three models (Model 4, Model 5, and Model 6), we introduce proxy variables 
that capture new equity issues market conditions and private firms' demand for capital at the time  
of an IPO. Model 4 includes 'hot' and 'cold' dummy variables to capture aggregate number of new 
issues. In Model 5, 'hot' and 'cold' dummy variables take account of aggregate average initial return. 
Neither the aggregate number of issues, nor the aggregate levels of initial return explain deliberate 
premarket underpricing. This result is somewhat surprising since the literature reports cyclicity in 
both the number of IPOs and the level of average initial return. Our study is the first to analyse the 
impact of these two factors on the level of deliberate premarket underpricing. We conclude from 
our analysis that premarket underpricing is independent of IPO market conditions at the time of a 
particular new issue. 
In Model 6, we use the change in real private nonresidential fixed investment as proxy for 
private firms' demand for capital. The impact of this proxy variable has not attracted any attention 
in existing studies using a SFA framework. Our findings indicate lower average underpricing during 
periods of 'hot' demand for private firms' capital. This result is similar to the evidence provided in 
Yung, Çolak and Wei (2008). However, they do not use the more refined measure of deliberate 
premarket underpricing. Our findings also show that 'cold' periods for private firms' demand for 
capital have lower average underpricing. This evidence is somewhat surprising and would suggest 
that any exogenous shock leads to a lower average underpricing and deserves future investigation 
in other stock markets.  
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Table 4: Estimates of stochastic pricing frontiers and the level of deliberate premarket 
underpricing 
 
All six models use the same pricing factors (Panel A). Panel B shows the factors that explain variations in deliberate 
underpricing. Panel C reports the initial return decomposed into deliberate underpricing and early aftermarket 
mispricing. Model 1 is the basic model and explains deliberate underpricing as a function of ex ante uncertainty 
surrounding firm value between new issues market participants. Model 2 augments Model 1 with variables that capture 
deal characteristics. Model 3 augments the previous models with third-party certification variables. Model 4 augments 
previous models with 'hot' and 'cold' dummy variables to capture the aggregate number of new issues at the time of a 
particular IPO.  Model 5 replaces the aggregate number of new issues with the aggregate initial return at the time of a 
particular IPO. Model 6 replaces the aggregate initial return with the demand for private capital. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Pricing Factors       
       
Ln (EBIDTA) 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Negative EBIDTA -0.128*** -0.184*** -0.180*** -0.179*** -0.178*** -0.179*** 
 (0.049) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Ln (Capital Expenditure) 0.046*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln (Total Assets) 0.064*** 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Ln (Leverage) -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Oil and Gas 0.001 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.105) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) 
Manufacturing -0.034 -0.071* -0.070* -0.069 -0.070* -0.070* 
 (0.031) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Computers 0.229*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 
 (0.038) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Electronic Equipment 0.130* -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.068) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Transportation -0.019 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.004 
 (0.027) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Scientific Instruments 0.061 -0.000 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.009 
 (0.093) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Communications 0.095 0.115*** 0.118*** 0.120*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 
 (0.092) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Utilities -0.003 -0.011 -0.014 -0.012 -0.015 -0.017 
 (0.042) (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) 
Retail 0.101 0.053* 0.055* 0.056* 0.055* 0.054* 
 (0.062) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) 
Financial Services 0.165** 0.058* 0.061* 0.062* 0.064* 0.061* 
 (0.066) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) 
Health 0.028 -0.085 -0.086 -0.082 -0.086 -0.080 
 (0.151) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.057) 
Chemical Products 0.124** 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.021 
 (0.060) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) 
Constant 2.124*** 2.498*** 2.501*** 2.501*** 2.502*** 2.503*** 
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
2ln v        
Constant -2.395*** -2.807*** -2.811*** -2.814*** -2.813*** -2.815*** 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
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Panel B: Underpricing Factors 
       
2ln
iu
        
Ln (Sales) -0.023 0.264*** 0.263*** 0.265*** 0.264*** 0.263*** 
 (0.081) (0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.073) 
Ln (Firm Age) 0.259* -0.125* -0.124* -0.122 -0.124* -0.123 
 (0.154) (0.076) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) 
Equity Retained  0.124 0.071 0.078 0.089 0.118 
  (0.182) (0.183) (0.183) (0.184) (0.183) 
Ln (Proceeds)  -2.666*** -2.690*** -2.680*** -2.668*** -2.707*** 
  (0.303) (0.313) (0.312) (0.312) (0.307) 
Lock in Dummy  1.140*** 1.168*** 1.169*** 1.180*** 1.076*** 
  (0.184) (0.191) (0.190) (0.192) (0.191) 
Ln (Underwriter Fee)  0.480* 0.518* 0.523* 0.504* 0.531* 
  (0.276) (0.280) (0.280) (0.280) (0.272) 
Ln (Number of Uses of 
Proceeds) 
 1.024*** 1.057*** 1.043*** 1.046*** 1.116*** 
  (0.179) (0.183) (0.182) (0.183) (0.184) 
Underwriter Ranking   -0.022 -0.022 -0.025 -0.019 
   (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
VC Backing   0.489* 0.480* 0.476* 0.514* 
   (0.271) (0.270) (0.270) (0.272) 
Hot Market    -0.430 0.278 -0.361** 
    (0.465) (0.262) (0.165) 
Cold Market    0.472 0.103 -0.333** 
    (0.463) (0.271) (0.165) 
Oil and Gas 19.441 -0.175 -0.148 -0.165 -0.155 -0.027 
 (1227.892) (0.982) (0.984) (0.996) (0.979) (0.982) 
Manufacturing -8.852 -0.431 -0.416 -0.389 -0.411 -0.397 
 (17274.556) (0.542) (0.543) (0.541) (0.543) (0.545) 
Computers 28.073 0.819*** 0.804*** 0.814*** 0.804*** 0.775*** 
 (1224.192) (0.270) (0.273) (0.272) (0.272) (0.271) 
Electronic Equipment 27.660 0.410 0.373 0.403 0.340 0.364 
 (1224.192) (0.385) (0.390) (0.389) (0.391) (0.393) 
Transportation -10.439 0.115 0.086 0.069 0.051 0.054 
 (26486.217) (0.434) (0.431) (0.430) (0.431) (0.425) 
Scientific Instruments 25.509 0.439 0.332 0.345 0.328 0.303 
 (1224.199) (0.395) (0.404) (0.407) (0.406) (0.407) 
Communications 25.989 1.726*** 1.756*** 1.777*** 1.752*** 1.782*** 
 (1224.197) (0.560) (0.549) (0.551) (0.553) (0.533) 
Utilities -6.578 0.208 0.243 0.296 0.223 0.194 
 (20664.123) (0.773) (0.789) (0.786) (0.789) (0.799) 
Retail 25.009 -0.055 -0.024 -0.011 -0.026 -0.029 
 (1224.196) (0.394) (0.400) (0.398) (0.395) (0.403) 
Financial Services 27.755 0.542 0.574 0.624 0.605 0.557 
 (1224.192) (0.434) (0.430) (0.428) (0.429) (0.431) 
Health 26.618 0.007 0.016 0.094 0.029 0.133 
 (1224.198) (0.633) (0.646) (0.638) (0.644) (0.606) 
Chemical Products 28.275 1.588*** 1.558*** 1.574*** 1.558*** 1.551*** 
 (1224.192) (0.422) (0.427) (0.426) (0.426) (0.434) 
Constant -31.818 3.144*** 3.321*** 3.300*** 3.251*** 3.592*** 
 (1224.192) (1.136) (1.157) (1.153) (1.159) (1.135) 
 -0.0222 0.2648*** 0.2633*** 0.2655*** 0.2647*** 0.2635*** 
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Observations 3131 2437 2386 2386 2386 2386 
Log-likelihood values -792.086 -284.714 -278.289 -277.273 -277.676 -274.756 
RZ2 0.502 0.576 0.576 0.575 0.576 0.576 
 
Panel C: Components of Initial Return 
       
Initial return (%) 19.085 19.085 19.085 19.085 19.085 19.085 
Deliberate Premarket 
Underpricing (%) 
7.072 13.896 14.109 14.185 14.148 14.170 
Aftermarket Mispricing (%) 9.952 3.208 3.048 2.972 3.007 2.981 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. RZ2 is the goodness of fit measure captured in 
equation (6) for the model of the determinants of underpricing reported in panel B. 
 
6.3. Disentangling deliberate premarket underpricing and aftermarket mispricing  
 
We identify deliberate premarket underpricing from the asymmetric component of the variance in 
our stochastic frontier models. Our estimates of deliberate underpricing in Panel C of Table 4 range 
between 7.07% (Model 1) and 14.19% (Model 4), depending on model complexity. Augmenting 
Model 1 (the basic model) and introducing deal characteristics, third-party certification, and 
market conditions block by block results in estimates of deliberate premarket underpricing 
converging to approximately 14%. 
The aftermarket mispricing is the complementary value to deliberate premarket underpricing, 
with the two components adding up to initial return. As shown in Panel C of Table 4, our estimates 
of aftermarket mispricing range between 2.97% (Model 4) and 9.95% (Model 1), converging to 
approximately 3% if we augment our basic model with deal characteristics, third-party 
certification, and market conditions. 
Table 5 presents how much of the variation in our estimates of deliberate premarket 
underpricing relates to the variation in initial return. As with the frontier exercise, this regression is 
run on IPOs with positive, negative as well as zero observed initial return12, so as not to bias the 
sample. The coefficient for deliberate premarket underpricing is negative and statistically 
significant, compared to Hunt-McCool, Koh and Francis (1996) who report a positive and significant 
coefficient and Chen, Hung, and Wu (2002) who report a positive but insignificant relationship. 
Both these papers report a very low R-squared ranging between zero and 2%, compared to 
approximately 3% in our case. Our results suggest that a portion of initial return can be explained 
by deliberate premarket underpricing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
12 About 20% of the sample has zero or negative initial return. 
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Table 5: OLS regression of IPO initial return on deliberate premarket underpricing 
 
Estimates of aftermarket mispricing and deliberate premarket underpricing rely on the model definitions used in Table 4. 
Initial return is the dependent variable.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Deliberate Underpricing 0.353** -0.559*** -0.575*** -0.581*** -0.579*** -0.579*** 
 (0.121) (0.072) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073) 
Constant 16.590*** 26.946*** 27.374*** 27.503*** 27.454*** 27.460*** 
 (1.174) (1.351) (1.378) (1.380) (1.379) (1.381) 
Number of Observations 2959 2290 2247 2247 2247 2247 
R2 0.003 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.027 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
Our analysis shows that the proportion of deliberate underpricing is the dominant component, 
when compared to aftermarket mispricing, and explains, at least to some extent, the variation in the 
overall initial return.  These findings provide evidence in support of the IPO information 
asymmetry literature and the resulting pricing inefficiencies.  The presence of pricing inefficiencies 
is not a challenge to the efficient market hypothesis, but rather a confirmation that information 
asymmetry between firm insiders, outside investors, and professional advisers in the primary 
market will lead to deliberate underpricing. 
 
 6.4. Explaining aftermarket mispricing 
 
Table 6 confirms that aftermarket mispricing is significantly influenced by trading volume in IPO 
shares after the first day of trading, the price adjustment between the filing price range and the 
offer price to reflect investor demand in shares, equity retained by pre-IPO owners in the post-IPO 
firm, underwriter reputation, and offer size. As discussed below, our findings support earlier 
studies, although we note that the studies quoted below all use initial return compared to our more 
refined aftermarket mispricing measure.  
 Trading volume in the aftermarket captures the demand for shares in the secondary market. 
Our findings show that demand and aftermarket mispricing are positively correlated and hence 
consistent with those reported in Aggarwal (2000, 2003), Ellis, Michaely and O'Hara (2000, 2002) 
and Ellis (2006).  IPOs for which the offer price is above the initial filing price range have, on 
average, higher aftermarket mispricing. The price revision is likely to capture the demand for 
shares revealed during the marketing phase of an IPO. Our findings are consistent with those 
reported in Hanley (1993) and Ellis (2006). Equity retained has a negative association with 
aftermarket mispricing.13 A higher proportion of equity retained will limit the number of shares 
available for trading. Accordingly, lower levels of free float will create excess demand in shares 
available for trading and hence will result in an increase in share prices. Our findings are consistent 
                                                        
13 The non-linear data transformation on equity retained, RET, into                   means that the 
larger the negative value of    the higher the proportion of equity retained. 
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with the evidence reported in Chen, Hung and Wu's (2002) analysis. Therefore, equity retained 
seems to be able to explain aftermarket mispricing rather than deliberate premarket underpricing, 
in contradiction to the signalling argument.  
 
Table 6: Mispricing in the early aftermarket 
Estimates of aftermarket mispricing and deliberate premarket underpricing rely on the model definitions used in Table 4. 
Aftermarket mispricing is the dependent variable. 
 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
% of Shares Traded 0.356*** 0.415*** 0.415*** 0.417*** 0.416*** 0.413*** 
 (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Above Filing Range 10.970*** 11.453*** 11.490*** 11.406*** 11.457*** 11.777*** 
 (2.329) (2.712) (2.715) (2.719) (2.716) (2.712) 
Below Filing Range -3.036 -3.661 -3.758 -3.780 -3.726 -3.939 
 (2.364) (2.851) (2.854) (2.858) (2.855) (2.852) 
Equity Retained -7.799*** -9.155*** -9.191*** -9.145*** -9.285*** -9.246*** 
 (2.402) (2.809) (2.812) (2.816) (2.813) (2.810) 
Underwriter Reputation -0.794 2.257*** 2.365*** 2.346*** 2.378*** 2.381*** 
 (0.622) (0.761) (0.762) (0.763) (0.763) (0.762) 
Offer Size 0.433 6.676*** 6.564*** 6.601*** 6.539*** 6.561*** 
 (0.899) (1.080) (1.082) (1.083) (1.082) (1.081) 
Constant -16.626*** -76.023*** -76.642*** -76.845*** -76.798*** -76.818*** 
 (4.184) (5.108) (5.114) (5.121) (5.116) (5.109) 
Observations 1577 1334 1334 1334 1334 1334 
R2 0.320 0.420 0.420 0.421 0.421 0.420 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
IPOs brought to market by more reputable underwriters are subject to greater aftermarket 
mispricing. This finding suggests that more reputable underwriters are more likely to provide price 
support in the early aftermarket. Price support leads to a censoring of aftermarket mispricing 
distribution. Our evidence is therefore consistent with Ruud (1993), Asquith, Jones and Kieschnick 
(1998) and Aggarwal (2000, 2003). Offer size has a positive association with aftermarket 
mispricing. This finding does not support the notion that investors perceive smaller IPOs as riskier 
compared to larger new issues of more established companies. Our evidence contradicts the 
findings reported in Beatty and Ritter (1986), Ritter (1987), and Carter (1992). 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature in light of the ongoing debate on 
whether deliberate premarket underpricing or aftermarket mispricing is the dominant explanation 
of observed initial return. First, we add to the scarce literature on the use of SFA as a tool for 
disentangling deliberate premarket underpricing from initial return. Using data on a sample of U.S. 
IPOs, we estimate a stochastic IPO pricing frontier, distinguishing between pricing factors and 
underpricing factors to estimate the maximum (fair) offer price. Pricing factors are the primary 
drivers of equity value and our paper employs a larger set of pricing factors compared to earlier 
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studies. This allows us to provide more reliable estimates of the maximum (fair) offer price and 
estimates of deliberate premarket underpricing. Our estimation returns deliberate premarket 
underpricing averaging at 14%. This compares to observed average initial return of 19.1%. In a 
separate regression of initial returns on deliberate underpricing, we find that a portion of initial 
return can be explained by deliberate premarket underpricing. 
Second, we use our refined measure of deliberate underpricing to test the commonly held view 
that information asymmetry surrounding IPO value among new issues market participants explains 
variations in deliberate underpricing. Existing empirical studies that seek to explain initial return 
do not distinguish between deliberate premarket underpricing and aftermarket mispricing, which 
could potentially make their findings less robust by assigning different weights to these 
explanatory factors. We therefore provide new insights into the validity of existing theory and 
empirical studies. We proxy information asymmetry by variables capturing ex ante uncertainty 
surrounding firm attributes, deal characteristics, third-party certification, IPO market conditions, 
and private firms' demand for capital. Our empirical exercise reveals only partial support for a joint 
signalling effect of equity retained by pre-IPO owners in the post-IPO firm and the proceeds at the 
disposal of the issuer. We present evidence that equity retained is an unlikely signalling mechanism 
to convey firm value to outside investors through deliberate premarket underpricing. New issues 
market conditions are not found to impact on deliberate premarket underpricing. The impact of 
new issues market conditions has not attracted any attention in existing studies using a SFA 
framework. Our findings also indicate lower average underpricing during periods of 'hot' demand 
for private firms' capital and show that 'cold' periods for private firms' demand for capital have 
lower average underpricing. This evidence is somewhat surprising and would suggest that any 
exogenous shock leads to a lower average underpricing and deserves future investigation in other 
stock markets.  
Finally, once we have estimated the deliberate underpricing component, we are then able to 
recover an estimate of aftermarket mispricing, which we then test against proxies of trading 
activity, allowing us to test the hypothesis that IPO market value partly depends on the trading 
activity in the early aftermarket. We find evidence that aftermarket mispricing is affected by 
trading volume in IPO shares on the first day of trading, the price adjustment between the filing 
price range and the offer price to reflect investors' demand for shares, equity retained by original 
owners, underwriter reputation, and offer size. 
Our analysis reveals that deliberate underpricing is the more dominant component that makes 
up initial return when compared to the fraction of aftermarket mispricing. Deliberate underpricing 
is identical to the pricing inefficiency in our SFA analysis. This pricing inefficiency is not a challenge 
to the efficient market hypothesis in which prices quickly and accurately adjust to a new 
equilibrium as a result of trading, but instead confirms that information asymmetry between new 
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issues market participants surrounding firm value in the primary market will lead to deliberate 
underpricing in the absence of trading. Our proxy variables that capture information asymmetry at 
different stages of the flotation process explain a large fraction of the variation in estimated 
deliberate underpricing across estimation models. 
While outside investors benefit from deliberate underpricing, issuers leave money on the table 
which could potentially leave the IPO market subject to Akerlof's (1977) classic adverse selection 
problem. This adverse selection problem could lead to an inefficient functioning of the IPO market 
and - at the extreme - to market failure if IPO firms completely withdraw from the new issues 
market if deliberate underpricing reaches unsustainable levels. If issuers have to leave an excessive 
amount of money on the table, then firms might seek an alternative way to exit from their 
investment or other means of raising capital. 
Our study implies that new issues market participants can to some extent influence aspects of 
information asymmetry at different stages of the flotation process and hence deliberate 
underpricing, while other aspects are beyond the direct control of market participants. On the one 
hand, issuing firm attributes such as, for example, the amount of sales in the accounting period 
before flotation or firm age are factors beyond the direct control of issuers at the time of flotation. 
On the other hand, issuers appear to be able to more directly influence deliberate underpricing 
through decisions and actions relating to deal characteristics, third-party certification, and possibly 
market timing. For example, the presence of lock-in agreements by pre-IPO owners increases the 
level of demand for the shares and hence underpricing, while having no lock-in agreements 
increases information asymmetry between firm insiders and outside investors.  Underwriter fees 
will be higher for those IPOs for which relatively little public information is available. Therefore, 
more direct disclosure by issuers during the flotation process will lead to lower levels of 
information asymmetry among new issues market participants and ultimately lower underpricing 
for IPOs of identical levels of business and financial risk. An ability to take actions by market 
participants to influence the level of deliberate underpricing is important for the new issues market 
to continue functioning and to reduce the possibility of an adverse selection problem to minimize 
the danger of a complete withdrawal of all IPO firms from this market. 
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